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ADDRESS 



W 



Maj. Gen. A. A. Humphreys 



¥ft^ Mii<i^sfiY g^i;vid5;>'^ 



OF THE LATE 



^ ^ \) J • 

United States Army, 

MADE AT 

The Meade Memorial Meeting 

OF 

¥l)e Citi^ei^^ of ?liilkdelpl:(ik, 

jSfoveii\feei' 1§, 1§T3. 



WASHINGTON, D. C. 

GIBSON BROTHERS, PRINTERS. 
1872. 



ADDRESS 

Maj. Gen. A. A. Humphreys 

ON 



or THE LATE 



jp. |r«. |f ^iic |ordott padc, 



United States Army, 



MADE AT 



The Meade Memorial Meeting 



Ylie Citi^^eiv^ of 'Pl|ilaeleLpliik, 

Xoven-\bef 18, 1§72. 




WASHINGTON, D. C. 

GIBSON BROTHERS, PRINTERS. 

1872. 



t-^'con 



\ /■ V 



ADDRESS. 



Felhnii-Citlzens of Philadelphia : 

As the friend and associate of the soldier whose loss the 
army and the nation deplore, I have been asked to address 
you concerning his military services. 

It is fitting that this duty should be devolved on me, for 
undoubtedly I was more intimatel}^ associated witli him during 
the time he commanded the Fifth Corps and the Army of the 
Potomac tlian any other ofhcer. Besides, I have known him 
ever sinc3 his entran33 into the service, then an intelligent, a 
polished, and witty young officer, on duty with the troops in 
Florida. 

My second recollection of him is as an engineer, engaged 
under Captain Talcott, of the Corps of Engineers, upon an 
elaborate survey and investigation at the mouths of tlie Mis- 
sissippi River, in which the facts elicited by some original ex- 
periments of his led me, many years after, to a series of inves- 
tigations which developed the law governing the formation of 
the bars and shoals at the moutli of that river, from which 
most important consequences have followed for the improve- 
ment of navigation and the increase of commerce. 

We next find Meade engaged in the survey of the northeast 
boundary line between the United States and Great Britain ; 
then, in river and harbor improvements ; and in the Mexican 
war we see him as an officer of Engineers on the staff of Gen- 
eral Taylor and of General Soott, distinguished for skill and 
intrepidity; subsequently he was occupied with light-house 
construction, and during the four years preceding the civil 
war liad charge of the geodetic survey of the great lakes, in 
his conduct of which he added largely to liis scientific and en- 
gineering reputation. 



T have referred to these varied occupations because they 
gave the training which fitted him for the great part he was 
soon to fill. In tliem he learned to plan carefully in advance, 
and to execute promptly and thoroughly; here he acquired 
the habit of (piick and accurate observation, and l)ecaine fer- 
tile in expedients to meet unlooked-for exigencies. 

Early in the civil war we find him a Brigadier-General of 
Volunteers, commanding a brigade in the Pennsylvania Re- 
serve Corps, M'hich constituted a division in the Army of the 
Potomac, and taking an active part in the battles of Gaines' 
Mill and Glenchile, in the last days of June, 18f)2, being se- 
verely wounded in the latter. Returning to the field as soon 
as the condition of his wound would permit, he was assigned 
to the command of a division, and distinguished himself in 
the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, being placed in 
command of Hooker's Corps when that officer was wounded 
and taken from the field. For these services he was promoted 
to the rank of Major-General of Yolunteers in November of 
18G2. 

As a Division Comnuinder he was impetuous in attack ; and 
at Fredericksburi!; broke throu2:h the ri«'ht of Lee's line, and 
penetrated far to its rear, but was overborne by numl)ers, and 
forced back with heavy loss. Quickly following this con- 
spicuous service, he was, in the latter part of December, 1862, 
promoted to the command of the Fifth Army Corps, and at 
Chancellorville his sagacious advice and soldierly bearing 
made so profound an impression upon the commander of the 
Army of the Potomac, that, in asking some two months later 
to be relieved from its charge, he designated General ]\[eade 
as his successor. 

On tlie morning of tlie 28th of June, 180;>, when in the 
vicinity of Frederick, J\[d., with the Fifth Corps, General 
Meade was placed by the President in command of the Army 
of the Potomac, which at that time was not far from Fre<k'r- 
ick, following carefully the movements of Lee. 

Lee was on tliat day at Clunnbersburg, about 50 miles north, 



a little west, of Frederick, with two of his three corps, Long- 
street's and Hill's. Ewell, with two of his divisions, was at 
Carlisle, about 30 miles north of Chambersbiirir, his third di- 
vision, under Early, being at York. 

Let us see what Lee says as to the object of his presence at 
these points, more than 200 miles away from Fredericksburg, 
Va. In his official report of his operations, written a month 
after the battle of Gettysburg, he states that the Army of the 
Potomaft occupied such a position opposite Fredericksburg 
that it could not bo attacked with advantage, and that by his 
moving northward through the great Yalley of Virginia the 
corresponding movements of the Army of the Potomac would 
probably offer a fair opportunity to strike a successful blow at 
tliat army ; that such a movement would disarrange our plan 
of campaign for the summer and consume our time, and that 
in addition to these advantages it loas hojied that other val- 
uable results might be attalnedbymilitary success. Actuated, 
he says, by these and other important considerations that may 
hereafter be j) resented, the movement began. 

These other important considerations have never yet been 
presented. The campaign having failed, it is not to be ex- 
pected that its great object will ever be an}' more distinctly ac- 
knowledged. Let us see further what he says in this report. 
The absence of his cavalry, which was making a raid around 
the Army of the Potomac, doing no harm to it, rendered it im- 
possible for him (he says) to obtain accurate information of 
the movements of .our army, and he did not know whether it 
had crossed the Potomac. Preparations, he states, were now 
made (on the 28th and 29th June) to advance upon Harris- 
burg. This sentence, I think, reveals the great object of his 
campaign. It was the capture of this city, Philadelphia. 

There were at least two fatal errors in the premises on which 
this plan was formed : one of these was the conviction the Army 
of Northern Virginia derived from Chancellorville — that it 
could beat the Army of the Potomac, wherever it found it; 
the second was, tliat the handling of the Arm'y of the Poto- 



6 

mac at Cliaiu^ellorville would be repeated in Pennsylvania. 
In both these convictions they found themselves fatally de- 
ceived. The Armv of the Potomac did not fiy;ht at Chancel- 
lorville. The Eleventh Corps, badly posted, was permitted 
to be surprised by overwhelming numbers, and routed. The 
Tliii-d Corps, aided l)y artillery posted by Pleasanton, threw 
itself into the breach, arrested the forward movement of the 
enemy, and the next morning was allowed to sustain the at- 
tack of Lee's whole force for several hours, losing in killed 
and wounded a large part of its numbers. It was of course 
obliged to fall l)ack upon the other portion of the army, the 
First, Second, Fifth, and Twelfth Corps, in position near by, 
Justin rear of Chancellorville. Oidy parts of some of these 
Corps were partially engaged in covering the witlidrawal of 
the Third Corps. 

Sedgwick, advancing from Frederickslmrg Avith the Sixth 
Corps and one division of the Second Corps, was then attacked 
by Lee, and forced back over the Potomac. Lee, in this op- 
eration, had 00,000 men, Longstreet's Corps being absent ; 
Hooker not less than 90,000 men. It is not surprising, then, 
that the Army of Northern Virginia should have made a false 
estimate of its prowess, or at least of that of tlu> Army of tlie 
Potomac. 

On the night of the 29tli June, Lee learned that the Army 
of the Potomac had crossed the Potomac, and had advanced 
as far as Frederick ; he also learned that its connnand had 
changed hands. His order for movement on Harrisburo; was 
at once changed, and Longstreet, Hill, and Ewell were ordered 
to concentrate at Gettysburg, a small town 25 miles from 
Cluunbersburg, and some 10 miles east of the Blue Ridge, 
from which roads radiated in all directions. 

Meade states that he passed the 28th June in ascertaining 
the strength and position of the different Corps of the army, 
and in bringing up the cavalry from the rear. He also care- 
fully inquired into the strength and position of the enemy, so 
far as known. He further states that his predecessor left 



camp in a few hours after lie was relieved, and tliat lie did 
not receive. from liiin any intimation of a plan of operations, 
or imy views upon the situation ; that he was not aware that 
General Hooker had anj, but was waiting further exigencies 
of the occasion to govern him, just as he (Meade) did subse- 
(piently. On the morning of the 29tli Meade put his army in 
motion for Harrisburg, expecting to compel the enemy to turn 
and mset him in battle. We have seen that Lee, on the eve- 
ning of that day, prepared to do so. 

On the evening of the 30tli the several Corps of the Army 
of the Potomac were on the roads leading to Gettysburg, from 
the east round to the south, and at distances from the town 
varying from ten to fifteen miles, excepting the Sixth Corps, 
which was more than thirty miles off. Buford, with his divis- 
ion of cavalry, was in Gettysburg. On that same night Meade 
learned from Buford that the heads of Lee's columns were 
moving on the roads leadirig to Gettysburg, and were proliably 
nearer than his to Gettysburg. 

Being entirely ignorant of the character of the ground 
about Gettysburg, he at once prepared a precautionary order 
of instructions to the Corps Commanders, not to be executed 
unless specially ordered at a subsequent time in a certain con- 
tingency, explaining the routes which the several Corps should 
follow to concentrate in a good position on Pipe Clay Creek, 
some three miles in rear of his headquarters at Taneytown. 
(Taneytowu, it may be remai'ked, is about 18 miles south of 
Gettysburg.) 

These instructions stated, " developments may cause the 
Commanding General to assume the offensive from his present 
positions." Not many hours after the issuing of these instruc- 
tions, new' developments did cause him to change his plans, 
but these instructions evince that foresight which proves his 
capacity to command an army. In similar circumstances, the 
agreement between Wellington and Bliicher to concentrate 
their two armies — nearly double the numbers of Napoleon — 
far to the rear in the vicinity of Waterloo, has been esteemed 



8 

it [)i-ui)f of their great abilit3\ On the evening of the 30th, 
Reynolds, with the First and Eleventh Corps, was ordered to 
move on the morning of the 1st of July from Emmettsl)urg to 
Gettysburg, and to report whether that site afforded a good 
field of battle. The Third Corps was to be in Emraettsburg 
on tlie morning of the 1st, and in fact reached there before all 
the Eleventh Corps had left it. About noon of the 80th, I 
was requested by General Meade to examine tlie ground in 
the vicinity of Emmettsburg upon the arrival tliere of the 
Third Corps, the second division of which I commanded, 
and ascertain whether it afforded a good position for Ijattle. 
The importance of the general position of Emmettsburg is 
derived from the fact that a piked road leads to it through the 
mountains from the Chambersburg valley, (along Mhicli part 
of Lee's force might move,) and that good branch roads lead to 
it along the foot of the mountains from the Cashtown pass. I 
have mentioned these two facts concerning Heynolds and my- 
self to show that Meade was active in learning; all that could 
l)e ascertained of the several positions where he nn'ght fight to 
advantage, as well as in moving towards Lee, and bringing 
the different parts of the Army of the Potomac within sup- 
porting distance of each other. That army consisted of about 
70,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 300 guns. The Army 
of Northern Virginia consisted of about 85,000 infantry, 8,000 
cavalry, and a due proportion of artillery. 

We all know how, on the morning of the 1st of July, Rey- 
nolds encountered Hill two or three miles west of Gettysburg, 
and was killed early in the day ; how Ewell arrived on the 
ground soon after ; and how tlie First and Eleventh Corps were 
forced l)ack to the position on which the fighting of the 2d 
and 3d of July took jdace. AVe know, too, that as soon as 
Meade learned what had occurred, the Third, Twclftli and 
other Corps were hurried u]) to the scene. Hancock, who 
was with Meade at Taneytown at the time, was dispatclied to 
take command of the advance, and lie reported at al)out half- 
past five tliat the position was sufficiently good, when Meade 



9 

set the remainder of the army in motion for tlie Held, and 
arrived upon the ground at midnight. All the army was con- 
C3ntrated there by one o'clock next day. 

One of Meade's first directions to his Chief-of-Staff, Butter- 
field, upon reaching there, was to learn everything about the 
roads leading to and from Gettysburg, so as to be prepared 
for any event that might occur — a very proper direction to 
give. All the Army of Northern Virginia was concentrated 
at Gettysburg during the night, except Pickett's division of 
Longstreet's Cor])S, which did not arrive until the morning of 
the 3d. 

Lee explains at some length why he attacked next day. 
Clearly, his true policy was to abstain from attack ; to move 
in concentrated formation as rapidly as practicable toward the 
objective of his campaign; to trench every position he occu- 
pied. The country, every step of the way to Philadelphia, is 
full of strong positions. Tlie exigencies of the case would 
have forced the Army of the Potomac to attack him. With 
nearly equal numbers, with rifled arms, and the trenches that 
may be thrown up in half-an-hour, or even less, the chances 
are all against the attacking force. But here, at Gettysburg, 
we had no trenches, except for a short distance on the right, 
on Gulp's hill and vicinity. In reality, the governing cause 
of Lee's attack was the success of the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia at Chancellorville. 

The disposition Meade made of his troops was the best the 
ground and circumstances permitted. The features of the 
l)attle-field are so well known that I shall not stop to desci'ibe 
them. 

You all know how the battle on the second day went on, 
and that the hardest fighting of the three days of battle took 
place on it. Lee attacked our left with Longstreet's Corps 
and part of Hill's, under the cover of woods, which concealed 
their approach, and a long-continued, desperate struggle en- 
sued, lasting from half-past four until seven o'clock, in which 
we lost the advanced part of the ground we liad taken up ; 
but the main position remained intact. 



10 

Oil the third day Lee resumed the attack with Pickett's di- 
vision of Longstreet's Corps (which luid arrived tliat morning) 
and Heth's division of Hill's Corps, supported hy two divis- 
ions wliich did not largely p:irt:('i[):ite in the struggle. The 
advance of the leading divisions was made over clear, (tpen 
ground, and was preceded Ijy a heavy tire from 115 guns. 

The gallant manner in which tliis adv:iiu'3 was made, under 
the powerful lire of our artillery and infantry, extorted tlie 
admiration of those against whom it was directed. But through 
the excellent dispositions of Meade, ahly seconded hy his com- 
manders, and the skill and courage of our officers and men, 
all the attacking force that reached our lines l)ecame our 
prisoners, as well as a considerable portion of tlie supports 
ing divisions, and tlie tliird day terminated in a victory for us, 
and the demolition of all the Confederate plans. 

Tmmediately upon the repulse, Meade ordered an advance 
from the left, which went forward, liut the day was too far 
spent for any important result to be gained. Longstreet and 
Hill ardently wished for a return attack upon their lines. 

Lee's losses were 18,003 killel and wounded and 13,000 
missing, a large part of the latter l)3iiig our prisoners, making 
a total loss of 31,000. Our losses were 10,500 killed and 
wounded and 0,000 missing, chiefl}" prisoners captured tlie 
tirst day, making a total loss of not less than 23,000. 

The Army of Northern A'^irginia never recovered from tin's 
blow, but its morale remained good. Sixty tliousand strong, it 
began to retreat in good order on the night of the J-th. Our 
experience has shown that one army can draw otf tVoiii another 
in the night without its l>:'ing discovered. Learning on the 
morning of the 5th that it had withdrawn, Meade sent tlie 
Sixth Corps and the c.ivali-y to follow it to the inomitain 
passes, through which Sedgwick found it would not be ])racti- 
cable to ])iirsue with any chance of success, owini»; to the fa- 
cility with which they could be defended with a small force. 
l\[eade, therefore, moved in ])iirsuit by the Boonsborough pass, 
the lirst practicable route through the mountains south of 



11 

those taken hy Lee, and on the 12th of July came up with 
him near WiUiamsport, on the Potomac Kiver. Here Lee oc- 
cupied a strong position, liis right resting on the river at 
Falling Waters, and his left resting on it at WiUiamsport, thus 
enclosing his crossing-places. This position, naturally strong, 
was well entrenched, with artillery j udiciously posted. Careful 
reconnoissancGS failed to ascsrtain a suitable point of attack ; 
hut notwithstanding, Meade ordered a reconnoissance in force, 
supported b}^ the whole army, at daylight on the mornino- of 
the Ittth. On the night of the 13th, Lee recrossed the Po- 
tomac. 

There was a great deal of clamor because Meade had not 
pressed Lee more vigorously in pursuit, and had not captui'ed 
his army at WiUiamsport. Let us see what means Meade 
had to accomplish all this. The return of the Army of the 
Potomac on the 5th July showed present for duty, 5-1,000 in- 
fantry and artillery, and 7,000 cavalry — in all, 61,000 men — 
just about the same force that Lee had ; and Lee's army was not 
demoralized, nor was it more fatigued or suffering than the 
Army of the Potomac ; the only material reinforcement 
Meade received before coming up with Lee at WiUiamsport 
was a division of 0,000 men under French. Had he assaulted 
he would have been repulsed with heavy loss, and without 
inflicting any matei'ial injury on the enemy. 

Let me (compare a little the battle of Getty si )urg and the 
movements immediately following it with a certain great bat- 
tle in Europe, to which, in some respects, it bears a resem- 
blance. This comparison will, I think, aflford means of appre- 
ciating properly the real merits of Meade and his army bet- 
ter than anj'thing else I can say. I refer to the battle of 
Waterloo ; a splendidly -fought Itattle on both sides. Extend- 
ing over a line only two or three miles long, it was all witliin 
view from many points; the greater part of the lighting was 
comprised within the limited space of six or seven hundred 
yards square, and in that space at the close of the battle lay 
manv thousands killed and wounded. 



12 

Wellington had posted liis army in a good position on the 
crest of a long slope of open ground. He had there 50,000 
infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and H,000 artillery, (156 guns;) in 
all, r.8,00(> men. 

Napoleon had drawn n\) his force ready for an attack on an 
opposite crest about a mile distant, the ravine between being 
equally distant from the two. His force consisted of 50,000 
infantry, 16,000 cavalry, and 7,000 artillerj' (246 guns ;) in all, 
7;^,000 men. But of this force, he was obliged to keep over 
12,000 men posted on his extreme right, to meet the expected 
advance (A' the Prussian army, wliich b?g.in to come U[> from 
tlie direction of Wavre soon after 12 o'clock. At Wavre, 
about ten or twelve miles to the French riglit, Grouchy, witli 
some 32,000 men and 100 guns, was attacking one of the four 
Prussian corps left there to detain him. The remainder of 
the Prussian army under Bliicher, 52,000 strong, with 100 
guns, was hastening as fast as the soft roads would permit, 
from an early hour in tlie morning, toward the Frencli riglit, 
to carry out the plan agreed upon with Wellington. Na- 
poleon, too, looked for Grouchy to arrive from the same di- 
rection. You will perceive that Napoleon was dealing with 
nearly double his own force. 

Napoleon's attacks on Wellington, li\-e in munl)er, began at 
half-past eleven o'clock, and continued at intervals until half- 
past seven in the evening. At half-past four the Prussians 
were up in fore?, and attacked the French right heavily and 
continuously, with increasing force, until the close of the battle. 

The last attack of Napoleon was made with great impetu- 
osity upon the whole of Wellington's line, the two forces being 
not more than sixty yards apart. Failing of success, the 
French rapidly withdrew, and Wellington says, seeing that 
thev withdrew in some confusion, lie advanced his whole line, 
but tlK'V moved no further than the positions that had been 
occupied by the French army, and from whieh its attacks had 
been made. There they halted for the night. The Fi-ench 
riii'ht also drew off, followed in ])ursuit by the Pi-ussians, who 
continued to press the French army all night. 



13 

In this battle, the losses were, in Wellington's anny, 10,000 
killed and wonnded ; in Bliicher's, 6,000 killed and wounded : 
the French losses have been stated at 18,500 killed and wonn- 
ded, and 7,000 jjrisoners. 

The French wounded, and a large portion of their artillery, 
the horses being killed, were left upon the field. The Prus- 
sians captured an immense booty — the trains, camp equipage, 
and nearly all the remaining artillery which was abandoned 
on the route. 

Recollect that this battle was fought, and all the operations 
l)rec3ding and following it were conducted, in a perfectly open, 
gently undulating country ; that tlie French were obliged to 
recross tlie i-iver 8aml)re on their frontier, some twenty-live 
miles from Waterloo, yet the prisoners captured l>y the Prus- 
sians in this pursuit amounted to only 6,000 ; the whole num- 
ber of French prisoners taken being stated at 7,000. Further, 
Grouchy did not hear of the battle until the next day, when 
Blucher and Wellington were between him and the river 
Sambre, the French frontier, yet he retreated into France 
without any loss. 

I tliink this, taken with what has been previously said, is 
sufficient to dispose of tlie question why Meade did not <'ap- 
ture Lee's army. 

After a careful examination of tlie subject, so far as I am 
capable of forming an opinion, I am led to the conclusion that 
Meade, at Gettysburg, liad a more difficult task tluin Welling- 
ton at Waterloo, and performed it equally well, although he 
liad no Blucher to turn the scale in his favor. 

A word or two more. Wellington, for his services in Por- 
tugal and Spain, had been raised through every grade of tlie 
British peerage to its highest rank, and Parliament had voted 
him large sums of money to enable him to live in a manner 
t'orrespondi ng to his position. For Waterloo, there was no 
additional rank in the peerage to give him, but Parliament 
voted him £200,000, about a million of dollars. The whole 
sum thus bestowed amouted to nearly four millions of dollars. 



14 

What remaining lionors or marks of esteem there were left in 
the hands of the sovereig-ns of Europe to (h'stril)nte, lie was 
decorated with. 

Meade, who was a Major in the Corps of Engineers, was 
promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General in tlie Regnlai- 
Arniy, and was gratified at this mark of approval. 

lie had to hear many unjust criticisms on his conduct of 
the hattle, and condemnation for not ca))turing the whole of 
Lee's army. But time etiaci's all such attempted hiemishes as 
these, and I helieve Meade always felt satisfied that history 
would do him justice. 

After crossing the Potonxac, Lee was disposed to rennnn 
near Winchester, among the fertile products of the valley of 
Virginia; but a well-directed thrust hy Meade, through Ma- 
nassas Gap, sent Lee rapidly out of the Valle}' and across the 
Ilap[)ahannock. 

On this river tin Army of the Potomac was ordered from 
Washington to rest, and several detachments were nuide from 
it to the city of New York, to North Carolimi, and elsewhere. 

In September, Meade having ascertained that Longstreet's 
Corps had been sent to Bragg, on the Tennessee River, (ex- 
c.'pting Pickett's division, which was recruiting south of 
the -Tames,) moved forward, and Lee fell back behind the Rapi- 
dan — a more defensible river than the upper Rappahannock. 
At this time the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were detached 
from the Army of the Potomac and sent to Chattanooga, and 
the two opposing armies on the Rapidan were reduced to 
about equal nundjers. 

Early in October, Meade was contemplating a movement 
upon Lee by our right flank, and on the morning of the 9th 
rode to Cedar Mountain to have a better look at the country 
in tlie direction of a certain mountain pass, when he discov- 
ered that Lee was making some movement on our right ; and 
at the same moment intelligence from the pickets and signal- 
stations began to jxiui- in, but the nature of the movement 
could not be ascertained with certaintv until Lee had concen- 



15 

trated his wliole army in the rear and ri^dit of Meade, threat- 
ening to intercept and l)reak np his lines of coinnmnication. 

The Army of the Potomac was at once set in motion, and 
directed toward Warrenton, witli tlic intention of attacking 
Lee while in the act of crossing the Rappahannock, with every 
cliance of a snccessful issue. But when the movement was 
half througli one of Meade's commanders brou'dit him wron^ 
mtormation of the movements, position, and apparent ol)ject 
of Lee; while from another commander, who should have 
furnished the most important information of all, he received 
none whatever. In this manner he was misled, a part of his 
army was placed in a critical condition, and the opportunity 
ot attacking Lee was lost. There followed a series of manoeu- 
vres by the two armies, during which the brilliant combats of 
Bristoe Station and Rappahannock Bridge took place, the 
movement ending in Lee's recrossing the Rapidan. After 
the war, Lee acknowledged to Meade that his scheme had 
been frustrated in this operation ; that he had been completelv 
outmanoeuvred. 

Among the criticisms made on these operations, it was said : 
Lee uncovered Richmond by his movement — why did not 
Meade move on that, and swap queens ? Tlie answer to it 
was very ol)vious. The two queens were not of equal value. 
Richmond was a small town, and any other much smaller 
town would have furnished equally well all the conveniences 
required for the personnel of the Confederate government. 
There were no Southern towns of any consequence within seve- 
ral hundred miles of it. Washington was four times larger than 
Richmond, was the capital of the country, and had collected 
in it all our national archives. Near to it was the rich and 
l)opulous city of Baltimore, and not far off the still richer and 
more populous city of Philadelphia. 

The task of the Army of the Potomac was to cover all these 
cities, and carry on oftensive operations against the Army of 
Northern Virginia in a country intersecited with wide, deep, 
rapid rivers, and covered in great part with dense forests and 



16 

thieket^i. To do all this required u large numerical superiority 
on the part of the Army of tlie Potomac. But it did not pos- 
sess any material superiority of numbers during the time Meade 
conimanded it until tlie spring of 1864. 

Having ascertained that Evvell's half of Lee's f(.»i'ct3 was so 
posted that it could be surprised by a well-directed rapid move- 
ment across the Rapidaii by tlic Army of the Potomac, Meade 
in tlie latter part of Noveml)er secretly crossed the Rapidan 
close to Lee's right, and advanced with the Second Corps, only 
8,000 strong, to tlie point of concentration close up on Ewell, 
at the hour named, 12 o'clock of the second day, and engaged 
the enemy. Tlie left wing reached its designated position in 
time, but the right wing, consisting of about half the arm}*, 
which should have united with the Second Corps at twelve 
o'clock, biMiame entangled in the Wilderness forest, and did 
not move more than three miles from the river, nor reach the 
point of concentration until tlio next morning. The opportu- 
nity for surprise was lost, and Lee had time to concentrate his 
army and take u]> a strong position on Mine Run, and en- 
trench it by the time Meade reached there. The only points 
of attack offering any chance of success were on Lee's right 
and left flank ; he occupied the inner and much shorter line of 
an arc, we the outer and longer line. Dispositions were made 
to attack iVom our right and left, the interval of four or 
rive miles between the two nearly equal parts of the army 
being thinly held with one or two divisions of infantry and ar- 
tillery; the most vicious disposition for battle possible, but the 
only one left Meade. Just as the artillery Are Avas about to 
cease, and the infantry on the right were about to run for- 
ward to the assault, an aide from the commander on the left 
dashed up and informed General Meade it was impossible to 
attack them. To liave attacked under such a condition would 
have resulted in disaster, for Lee, having nothing to conten<l 
with oil our left, and much shorter distance to move over than 
we, could have concentrated on our point of attack and repulsed 
it, and advancing on the open space between our two wings, 



17 

^vhich there was not time to close, could have divided our army 
in two. Instantly the order was given to suspend the attack, 
and Meade rode to the left, to see b}' personal inspection what 
the chance was there. He found it to be as represented, and 
the troops from the centre were returned to their former ]io- 
sitions. By this time the enemy had also discovered our plan of 
attack from tlie riglit, and were prepared for it ; tlie scheme had 
to be abandoned. 

It was, however, persistently urg-ed on General Meade to at- 
tack, because the public would be dissatisfied if he did not, and 
would not l)elieve that he ought not to liave attacked, unless 
he did attack and was bloodily repulsed. Meade knew at the 
time that if he did not attack there would be a clamor against 
him that would probably lead to his removal from command, 
but notwithstanding, he gave no ear to the counsel I have 
mentioned, preferring to be governed by liis own judgment 
rather than by pul)lic opinion. 

As the winter had commenced, and as Meade believed that 
the line of operations from Fredericksburg would not b.e 
viewed with satisfaction at Washington, he withdrew to liis 
former position on the north side of the Rapidan. 

During the winter certain military events took place, which, 
though of interest, have no important bearing on tlie present 
i>ubject. 

Before the season for active operations returned. Gen- 
eral Grant had been appointed Lieutenant-General, and placed 
in command of all the armies. He concluded to make his 
headquarters with tlie Army of the Potomac, Burnside's Corps, 
and the Army of tlie James 

During the winter and spring, the Army of the Potomac 
had been reinforced, and when the campaign opened consisted 
of 76,000 infantry, in three corps, commanded by Sedgwick, 
Hancock, and Warren, and aliout 12,000 cavalry, commanded 
by Sheridan, with a large artillery force, having its own guard, 
which, when the artillery was reduced, (about the middle of 
May,) was joined to one of the infantry corps. Purnside had 



18 

some 15,000 or 20,000 men, which united with the Army of' 
the Potomac early on the morning of the 6th of May, tlie sec- 
ond day of the battle of the Wilderness. 

Lee's force consisted of three corps, each about 20,000 
strong, commanded by Ewell, Hill, and Longstreet, wlio ar- 
rived the 3d of May, and 8,000 or 10,000 cavalry, commanded 
by Steuart, with a due proportion of artillery. 

The artillery of both armies was more than could be used in 
that country, and wnth us was cumbersome, and tlierefore re- 
duced when we were near Fredericksburg. 

The object of the campaign was to fight Lee's army and 
break it to pieces. Failing in that, upon our forcing it back 
upon Richmond, we were to destroy all lines of supply to that 
city upon tlie iu)rth 1)ank of the James River ; then cross over, 
and, encircling the town, desti-ov all lines of supply on the 
south side. 

Tlie (piestion tirst settled was, shall the movement be l)y 
the right flank, passing through Madison Court-IIouse and 
crossing the Rapidan at or above Lee's left flaid^. 

This was decided against, as beyond tlie Rapidan (as far as. 
could be learned) the roads did not admit (»f the ready move- 
ment <»f the dillerent corps for concentration, and if by Lee's 
movements he should avoid heavy lighting, he could, while 
maintaining his communication with his supplies at Richmond, 
liarass the new lines of communication and supply that must 
be opened for the Arni}^ of the Potomac toward the Potomac. 
River and Chesapeake Bay, as we advanced. The importance 
of this objection was shown by the necessity of sending so 
many thousands wounded from the Army of the Potomac by 
Fredericksburg, in two or three days after we began to move. 

The objection to moving by the left flank was that it took 
us through the tangled mass of woods called the Wilderness, 
where Lee, by prompt movement, could force us to stop and 
flght him, and where from the denseness of the woods and un- 
dergrowth, the troops acting on the defensive were unseen, 
while those moving to the attack could be plainly perceived. 



19 

It served aliiio.st us efiectiuilly as an iiitreiic-liineut tor the ariii}' 
acting on the defensive. 

The advantage of moving by the left flank consisted in keep- 
ing close to the Potomac River, and all lines of communica- 
tion and supply we should want to open from time to time, 
and whicli our army would eftectually cover. Accordingly it 
was decided to inove b}' the left. 

The project was to get through the Wilderness quickly, 
and endeavor to cut Lee's line of communication, (the Central 
Railroad,) somewhere between Louisa Court-House and Gor- 
donsville, and attack him in the comparatively open country. 

The moment our movement was perceived, Lee concen- 
trated. Ewell l)eing nearest to us, was thrust along the pike 
against us. Hill along the Orange C^ourt-IIouse plank-road ; 
Longstreet was to come up on our left flank. By simply 
thrusting himself against us, we were obliged to stop our 
movement to attack Lee ; we could not go on ; if we did, he 
would watch his opportunity and overwhelm some portion 
that was exposed. 

Meade knew that Lee's l)est course was to move against us 
and force us to attack liim in the Wilderness, as I have al- 
ready stated ; therefore, when, early in the morning of the sec- 
ond day of movement, advance parties of tlie enemy attacked 
our cavalry on the Orange Court-House plank-road and the 
advance guard thrown out on the pike, Meade apprehended 
that the flrst battle would be fought in the Wildei-ness. But 
there was no means of telling at first M'hether these small 
attacks were nmde simply by very advanced parties of the 
enemy, made for the purjiose of interrupting and delaying our 
marcli, or were made by the advance guards of Lee's main 
army. There was but one thing to do — to attack at once, 
clear them out of the way if we could, take prisoners, and 
find out wliei'e the main force of the Arni}^ was. Hancock, 
who moved promptly in the morning from Chancellorville 
on the route directed in the general order of the 3d May, was 
directed to halt at Todd's tavern until it could be ascertained 



20 

what the enemy's intentions were. They were soon disclosed. 
Ewell and Hill were close on ns, and were at once attacked by 
the Fifth Corps. Hancock was bronght back from the vicin- 
ity of Todd's tavern to the intersection of the Orange plank- 
road with the Brock road. Until he could get np, Getty's 
Division of the Sixth Corps was sent to that intersection, and 
Avas at once engaged with Ewell. The Sixth C^)i'ps Avas 
])Osted on our right. 

Thus commeiu'cd that extraordinary sei-ies of battles of two 
months' duration, at the termination of which the Army of 
the Potomac had lost more than (>0,000 men in killed and 
wounded. 

The position of General Meade all this time was a delicate 
one, o\vi)ig to the near presence of an otKccr of superior rank 
and connnand. He acquitted himself in it in such a manner 
as to command the respect and esteem of General Grant, be- 
tween whom and himself there Avas, I believe, complete ac- 
cord. For his eminent services in the campaign Meade Avas 
made a Major-General in the Regular Army. 

The close of June saw the commencement of Avhat is teruu^d 
the siege of Richmond and Petersburg, Avhich lasted until the 
1st of April, 180.5. During this long period, many opera- 
tions, battles, and cond>ats took place, Avith varying success. 
Throughout them all, the nuu-ke<l ability of Meade as a com- 
nuinder Avas conspicuous. 

The breaking of the lines of Petersl)urg on the 1st of April 
Avas succeeded l)y the flying, flghting retreat, and surrender of 
the Army of Northern Virginia, and with that surrender came 
peace. 

Perhai)s the very im})erfect reference to General Meade's 
militai'V life whicli I lune just made may serve to show what 
a great experience he had, and how valuable to his country 
his life has been, and that his death in full bodily and mental 
viffor is a screat national loss. 




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